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Abstract
Security sector reform is a fairly new concept in the world of political development. Security
sector reform often requires the development of various agencies and actors within the
government, prompting high costs as these developments occur. However, in light of the recent
economic crisis, there has been little economic growth in the Western Balkan countries. Despite
this lack of growth, security sector reform has continued to occur. This paper seeks to answer to
what extent each country’s economic development (or lack thereof) has impacted their security
sector reform. Using the definition established by the OECD, this paper analyzes security sector
reform in three countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Greece. The first two countries
analyzed are current analyses, while the third is a historical analysis of Greece’s security sector
reform including the initial security sector reform after democratization. The analysis is
completed using the four sectors of security sector reform listed in the OECD’s definition – core
security actors, security management and oversight bodies, justice and law enforcement
institutions, and non-statutory security forces – to measure growth in the security sector. In each
country analyzed, the growth in these sub-sectors of security reform will be compared to the
growth or lack of growth in that country’s GDP to understand how security sector reform is
financed, and if there are elements outside of a country’s GDP that impact how they fund reform
of their security sectors.
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Introduction
The Western Balkans are slowly gaining stature on the international level as they develop
economically and politically. Since the fall of the Republic of Yugoslavia and the war in the
Western Balkans, the former Yugoslav republics have achieved varying levels of development –
some have developed enough to join the European Union, and others have significant problems
to address before progressing as a stable country in the eyes of global powers such as the
European Union or the United States. One aspect of development that is particularly vital to the
stability and growth of each country in the Western Balkans (and in any country) is security
sector reform, as it is what allows a state to remain stable economically, politically and socially
by providing physical security and security of civil and economic liberties. The Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) defines security sector reform as “security
from disorder, crime and violence [which] is fundamental for… sustainable economic, social and
political development” (OECD 2007, 21).
Security sector reform can be achieved through different means and different security
mechanisms, but it is vital that the necessary sectors to support a secure country can be funded.
With that in mind, this paper seeks to understand how stunted economic development in the
Western Balkans has impacted their ability to fund security sector reform. The expectation is that
the most impacted area of security sector reform in the Western Balkans is in justice and law
enforcement, and that the lack of economic development in the Western Balkans has led to
security sector reform being funded by external actors. To understand the relationship between
economic development and security sector reform, this paper will first look at the surrounding
literature to define what scholars believe regarding security sector reform and how to finance it.
Then, this paper will analyze the security sector reform in several countries in order to examine
how each country’s economic development (or lack thereof) has impacted their security sector
reform. Finally, the paper will draw conclusions regarding both how each country finances their
security sector reform as well as why it is significant to understand the development of the
security sector in Western Balkan countries.

Young 3

Literature Review
Before addressing the schools of thought regarding how to best approach security sector
reform as well as how to best finance it, it is first necessary to more specifically explore the
concept of the security sector. According to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, the security sector includes four main aspects:
“core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and
immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight
bodies (e.g. ministries of defense and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public
complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons,
prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g.
private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia)” (OECD 2007, 22).
These four areas of the security sector work together to provide security from the disorder, crime
and violence which threaten the law and order of a democratic society. The elements of the
security sector vary in strength depending on the country whose security sector you are looking
at, however it is agreed throughout the literature that the OECD definition of security sector
reform is accurate in including the four areas listed.
With a better understanding of the makeup of a security sector, it is possible to move on
to the ideas in the literature regarding how to reform the security sector. There is wide consensus
that initial security sector reform occurs when a country is still developing, and is simply an area
of the public sector much like any other in a developed, functioning democracy (Abramson and
Williams 2006, 4). Again relying on the OECD, as they are an intergovernmental organization
whose expertise is referred to often in academia surrounding economic development, reform is
defined specific to the security sector as “transformation of the security system which includes
all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a
manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance,
and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework” (Abramson and Williams 2006,
4). Within this definition, though, are contrasting recommendations among scholars of how to
best approach this transformation.
Often the initial approach to reform when it emerged as an important part of development
was single-issue reform, in which the actors involved in security sector reform tend to focus on
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one sub-sector, often solely military development (Hendrikson 1999). However, as security
sector reform has grown as a field, the overwhelming majority of scholars support holistic
reform over single-issue reform. The whole of government approach to security sector reform,
founded by Bogdanor, argues that the best way to reform the sector is to approach reform
holistically, using insights from “other social sciences rather than just economics” (Christensen
and Lægreid 2007, 1059). This approach allows for influence in reform by political and
administrative leadership, allowing for accountability, according to Bogdanor. Hood, another
scholar in the field, would agree, arguing that when whole government measures are forgone it
leads to devolution of the sector because the political and administrative leaders are blamed for
any problems in the sector regardless of their influence – giving them the influence appropriates
that blame by turning it into accountability because the same people blamed for failures in the
sector are the ones influencing the reform (Christensen and Lægreid 2007, 1060).
These opposing approaches to reform as either single-issue reform or holistic reform in
the security sector are dependent on many aspects of the government implementing them, from
the influence of outside actors who may support more holistic reform to a budget which may
make holistic reform impossible. In the eyes of scholars, the choice seems clear for governments
– holistic reform is supported by scholars and should be the correct choice in order to achieve the
most effective and permanent reform. However, the methods of financing security sector reform
have a large impact on the type of reform that occurs. The scarcity of funding means that even in
holistic approaches to security sector reform, there is a need to prioritize what areas are going to
receive more funding, by extension prioritizing what areas develop more. In addition to
prioritizing based on funding, the funding for security sector reform often comes, at least in part,
by external actors, as the brunt of reform to the sector is occurring while a nation is developing,
not after it is already established (Brzoka 2006, 10). The involvement of multiple international
actors, ranging from international organizations to development donors to governments of
individual states who have a vested interest in the development of the country at hand (Brzoka
2006, 10). This international support, which is often vital to the fast and efficient development
and reform of the security sector, often comes with specific mandates and projects that direct the
funds towards certain sub-sectors.
Even after receiving funding for security sector reform either through its own government
or via donors and external actors, a country must, as stated, prioritize which areas of the sector
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will receive more funding. The overarching theme in the literature is funding public sub-sectors
within security, such as military or judicial reform. These are vital areas of reform, and no
scholar has argued that the public sector should be entirely ignored when focusing on
development and security sector reform. However, there are some scholars, such as Abramson
and Williams, who think that there should be emphasis on reform of the private sector because
“people in the developing world have come to rely on private providers for their day-to-day
security needs” (2006, 2). Others see private sector reform within the security sector as vital to
the success of the reform at all, because “typically, governmental and multinational donors do
not have a ‘standing army’ of serving civil servants and military and security officers who are
equipped with both technical and consulting skills and are willing to deploy (often at short
notice) to support capacity building” (Martin and Wilson 2010, 314). These disagreements
among scholars have left a lot of room to question the successes and dangers of different
approaches to financing security sector reform, and have raised an interesting question as to how
a nation finances security sector reform in a slow-growing economy.

Method and Case Studies
To study the stunted economic development in the Western Balkans and its impact on
security sector reform, this paper will use a pattern matching approach. The observed pattern is
the weakness in the Western Balkan economies since the financial crisis of 2008 (specifically
2009-2016), which has hindered their ability to achieve growth levels and structural stability in
their economies to match those they were achieving before the crisis. The expected pattern is that
security sector reform in the cases studied would have slowed due to the lack of economic
growth and because of structural problems within the economics of the Western Balkans.
There are several indicators which will provide evidence when examining these countries
to look for the expected pattern. To measure the development of security sector reform, the
indicators will be growth in each area of the security sector defined by the OECD. That would
mean an increase in core security actors, an increase in security management and oversight
bodies, an increase in justice and law enforcement institutions and an increase in non-statutory
security forces. To measure economic development of the chosen countries, the indicators will
be change in GDP (in percentage). Additionally, the qualitative indicator of structural reform as
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measured by the European Union will demonstrate the stability of the economy moving forward
so that the cases can support their security sector reform. It is worth noting here that cyber
security is not included as a sub-sector of security sector reform. This is done for several reasons:
first, the difference in technologies and cyber security between the time frames of the first two
countries’ reforms is very different from that of the third. Second, security sector reform is used
to strengthen the elements of government that allow for good governance, and cyber security
falls into a more technical, less critical aspect of security when it comes to the relationship
between the government and its citizens (OECD 2007).
The countries selected are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Greece. These countries
are all located in the Western Balkans and were all affected by the economic crisis, and
additionally are all at different stages in security sector reform. The three selected countries are
ideal for comparison because between the three countries there is a potential candidate to the
European Union (Bosnia and Herzegovina), a candidate to the European Union (Serbia) and a
member of the EU (Greece), which can help in understanding the development of security sector
reform with financial assistance from the EU, as many Balkan states are either members or
potential members of the EU. Additionally, analyzing Greece from a historic perspective may
provide insight into the steadiness of reform in security sectors, and could provide insight as to
what can be expected in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. This is a particular point of
interest, as the Western Balkans are potential members of the European Union, and as such it is
important to understand how the EU invests in these countries.

Analysis
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the least developed of the selected countries. After the
dissolution of the Yugoslav Republic, war broke out among ethnic Serbs, ethnic Bosnians and
ethnic Croats, all vying for control of Bosnian territory. After years of war, the Dayton Accords
were signed to end the fighting and establish the government in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Clinton 2017). Since the Dayton Accord was signed, the government has consisted of rotating
presidency based on ethnicity in order to calm tensions between the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian
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Croats, and Bosnian Serbs following the war (Clinton 2017). Due to the recent conflict, Bosnia
and Herzegovina has had less of an opportunity to develop than other countries in the Western
Balkans or any other country analyzed. Additionally, Bosnia was less economically prosperous
than some of its fellow republics within Yugoslavia, making it more difficult for Bosnia and
Herzegovina to develop (Clinton 2017). As far as measuring security sector reform, Bosnia and
Herzegovina is expected to have smaller amounts of reform because of the instabilities still
associated with its government.
The first indicator of a security sector reform, an increase in core security actors, has a
limited presence. The military structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina was only established in
2006, and has been largely unchanged since it was established. The presidency of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which rotates between the three major ethnic groups in the territory, establishes the
ethnic makeup of the military, meaning that it is a delicate issue to change the size of the military
because that alters the ethnic makeup as well (Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015). As far as police
force goes, the number of police increased in 2008, when Bosnia and Herzegovina added new
laws at the request of the European Union. The 2008 reform “provided for a number of new
state-level structures, such as the Directorate for Police Coordination Bodies, which would
generally provide for communication, cooperation and coordination among the police bodies of
Bosnia; the Agency for Forensic Examinations and Expertise that would work on forensic
aspects of police work such as DNA analysis, fingerprints analysis, biological examinations, to
name a few; the Agency for Education and Advanced Training of Personnel, which would
harmonize police training programs and develop new ones; and the Agency for Police Support
that would provide for wider support to Bosnia’s police institutions for a number of technical,
legal and financial aspects” (Padurariu 2014). These reforms mark an increase in security based
on core security actors by providing more support to police to be able to stop violence from
occurring and supply evidence of criminality, which intends to deter against crime. This increase
in police and government bodies indicate the increase of core actors in security sector reform.
The second indicator of security sector reform is an increase in security management and
oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defense and internal affairs, financial management bodies and
public complaints commissions). Bosnia and Herzegovina’s main security oversight bodies were
established in 2003 with the support of the European Union. Since then, the Bosnian government
set up an Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman as a main oversight body of the security
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sector, though without a mandate and without the necessary power to implement its
recommendations (ISSAT, 2017). The largest step in oversight bodies for security sector reform
since the financial crisis was the creation of the EU Special Representative position in 2011,
whose role is to support the Ombudsman for Human Rights. This was meant to be a scaling
down of international reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the position was ineffective as
politicians resisted the oversight body (ISSAT 2017). This is a technical increase in security
oversight bodies, though the increases were ineffective and did not result in an actual increase in
reform because politicians resist the oversight bodies in place.
The third indicator of reform is an increase in justice and law enforcement institutions
(e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems). The Bosnian
Ministry of Justice was established in 2003 at the end of the initial reform stages of 1998 to 2003
when Bosnia and Herzegovina completed their initial judicial reform. However, laws and judicial
procedures have not been harmonized, and there is no superior judicial authority to enforce the
constitution (ISSAT 2017). This is one step that is vital for Bosnia and Herzegovina to achieve
full reform of their security sector, and has exacerbated the problem of corruption present in the
country (ISSAT 2017). The reform present in the judicial area has been minimal since 2003.
The fourth and final indicator of security sector reform is non-statutory security forces
(e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia). The beginnings of private
security in Bosnia and Herzegovina as official, private corporations occurred with Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s transition to a market economy from 1996 to 2002. However, the most recent
update to private security legislation, passed in 2008, has yet to completely harmonize standard
legal practice of private security in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has inhibited the ability of
the sector to represent itself positively to the public (Krzalic 2009, 23). This has led to an image
of private security as supportive of corruption, further complicating the ability of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to promote transparency as they democratize (Krzalic 2009, 10). While scholars
agree that the private security sector is a growing force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the lack of
regulation takes away from private firms’ ability to successfully make Bosnia and Herzegovina
more secure, as there is no standard regulation for them (Krzalic 2009, 14). Overall, we see slow
growth in multiple areas of the security sector, indicating limited security sector reform in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Having analyzed the recent developments in the country’s security sector, it is possible to
analyze whether Bosnia and Herzegovina’s economic growth matches its security sector reform.
Scholars agree that the economic growth in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not reflect the growth
of the security sector, especially when highlighting the growth of judicial reform and police
structures. Before the financial crisis in 2008, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a GDP of throughout
the financial crisis. This level of growth indicates an inability on the part of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to fund their own security sector reform (Perdan 2007). Despite this lack of
growth, there has been growth in the security sector, raising the question of what international
actors have largely supported Bosnia and Herzegovina’s security sector reform.
When the Dayton Agreement was signed, it provided a framework for international actors
with specific mandates to stay involved in the post-war reform process in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Busterud 2013, 342). This was necessary at the time, as the country had little in
experience or resources to help them rebuild following the war. However, it has left Bosnia and
Herzegovina in a situation where international actors are driving the security sector reform
process rather than its own politicians or government. The largest example of international
involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the European Union. The EU signed a Stabilization
and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008, which is considered the first
step in potential candidacy to join the EU. However, that also means that the EU, rather than the
Bosnian government, is providing a lot of the motivation to improve the security sector in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and it is even demonstrated through examples seen earlier in the paper that
some of the main motivation for reform that has occurred was a push given to Bosnia and
Herzegovina by the EU. Other actors include NATO, the Ombudsman for Human Rights and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, all of whom provide support and funding
to different areas of security sector reform. In sum, the country is unable to fully finance the
necessary security sector reform alone, and are therefore reliant on the intervention of
international actors to fund it.

Serbia
While it also gained independence with the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia has seen more
growth and development since it became independent than Bosnia and Herzegovina. However,
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its government still has work to do in order to become a full-fledged democracy and free market
capable of joining the European Union as a member state. As far as measuring security sector
reform, Serbia’s more stable transition to a democratic institution would lead to the expectation
that it is more quickly able to implement security sector reform than Bosnia and Herzegovina,
because it was more quickly able to start liberalizing its market.
The first indicator of security sector reform, again, is an increase in core security actors.
Serbia’s armed forces declined greatly when Montenegro split and became independent in 2006.
Since then, Serbia’s armed forces has grown only slightly from 24,000 personnel in 2006 to
28,150 personnel in 2015 (World Bank 2017b). Additionally, the growth of military personnel
occurred between 2004 and 2006 before the financial crisis, with the size of military shrinking
from 29,125 to 28,150 personnel between 2008 and 2015 (World Bank 2017b). This information
alone does not indicate growth in the core security actors field of the security sector. The police
force has grown as of 2016, with 455 police officer to every 100,000 inhabitants, according to
the European Parliament (Lilyanova and Blagojevic 2016, 18). However, overall there is a lack
of transparency and accountability between the core security actors and the public, indicating the
need for further reform.
The second indicator of security sector reform is an increase in security management and
oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defense and internal affairs, financial management bodies and
public complaints commissions). While the ministry of internal affairs and the ministry of the
interior have been functioning since before the financial crisis, Serbia’s oversight system is
lacking in several places. There is still no body to oversee police activity, and oversight bodies
are not very transparent when they do exist in Serbia (Lilyanova and Blagojevic 2016, 18).
Serbia did initiate some oversight bodies after the financial crisis, such as the Public Oversight
Board to oversee auditing within the government in 2013 (European Commission 2016, 3).
Overall, the European Union’s assessment of Serbia’s growth in management and oversight
bodies is that it “needs to be further enhanced” (Lilyanova and Blagojevic 2016, 4).
The third indicator of reform is an increase in justice and law enforcement institutions
(e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems). In 2008, Serbia
established courts of specialized jurisdiction, and in 2010 Serbia established new misdemeanor
courts, high courts, commercial courts and appellate courts (Pancic 2011, 1). However, the total
budget for courts in 2016 was 23.12 Euros per inhabitant per year (0.5% of GDP), which has led
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to insufficient court practices and training of civil servants (Lilyanova and Blagojevic 2016, 14).
Specifically, “sustainable judicial reform will require the strengthening of public sector
accountability,” which requires more funding than it currently has (Berenschot 2013, 71). The
European Union states that the judicial bodies are not functioning independently from political
influence, making it ineffective in ensuring security for citizens, emphasizing the need for more
growth in the sector to increase accountability of the judiciary (Lilyanova and Blagojevic 2016,
54). Overall, this sector has experienced some growth in the number of institutions, but it still
needs support to continue to reform.
The fourth and final indicator of security sector reform is non-statutory security forces
(e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia). The number of private
security companies in Serbia has increased by almost 2,000 companies since 2008, indicating
serious growth in the private security sector (Pashley and Cools 2011, 5). This, however, comes
with similar issues within the sector to those in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbian private
security sector is not well regulated, and does not clearly define the types of services offered in
the private sector, meaning that there is a lot of freedom for private companies to take advantage
of the needs of the public sector. Specifically, because private clients “tend to invest more in
technical protection,” security companies can take advantage of the lack of regulation to
maximize profit (Petrovic and Milosevic 2017, 5). This lack of regulation needs to be addressed
by the government in order for the growth to be fully beneficial to the Serbian security sector.
Before the financial crisis in 2008, Serbia had a GDP of 49.26 billion USD, over double
its 20.94 billion USD GDP after the breakup of Yugoslavia (World Bank 2017a). Since 2008,
Serbia’s economy in terms of growth has fluctuated, and Serbia’s GDP as of 2016 is 37.745
billion USD, which is below even the initial drop in GDP Serbia faced during the financial crisis.
The negative growth percentage of 30.51% Serbia has seen is indicative of the incomplete
structural reforms to Serbia’s economy, which has crippled their ability to fund their own reform.
Despite this lack of growth, there has been growth in the security sector, meaning that much like
in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s case, Serbia has had assistance from international actors in order to
continue supporting security sector reform.
After exclusion from international actors prior to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
international actors became quite a presence in Serbia. International actors have been involved in
some aspects of security sector reform since the 2000s, but their involvement was kicked up in
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2006 after Montenegro became independent from Serbia and their armed forces were split.
Specifically, NATO has been involved with military and defense reform, along with other
bilateral stakeholders (Watkins 2010, 20). Additionally, while the European Union has been
involved with Serbia since before 2008, Serbia’s application to join the EU and acceptance as a
candidate country in 2009 and 2012 respectively, the EU has been heavily involved in reform in
Serbia, including all of the financial assistance that comes with the accession process.
Additionally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has funded research and
reform specific to policing in Serbia. It is clear from the involvement of these actors, as well as
the involvement of independent international donors, that Serbia’s security sector reform is
supported largely by external actors.

Greece
Security sector reform as a concept did not fully develop as a theoretical process until the
end of the Cold War. That being said, it is possible to analyze the development of Greek security
sector reform through the lens of the modern definition of security sector reform, piecing
together the elements of reform defined by the OECD. However, before analyzing Greek
security sector reform, it is necessary to highlight some key differences between Greek history
and the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Greece has been a functioning country for
the last 2500 years, giving it bases in democratic rule as well as in military that neither Serbia
nor Bosnia and Herzegovina could possibly have developed, having only formed as independent
countries after the 1980s with the breakup of Yugoslavia (Eleftheriadis 2007). Additionally, both
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia were republics within a communist rule prior to their
democratic transition, whereas not only had Greece introduced the idea of democratic rule
historically, but they were transitioning back to democracy from a military regime. These
differences are important to highlight not to take away from the comparison between security
sector reform in the three countries but to bring into focus the differing backgrounds and their
impacts on the needs of each country in the area of security sector reform.
Having highlighted the historic differences between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and
Greece, it is possible to analyze Greece from a historic perspective to look at its security sector
reform during its democratic transtition in the late 1970s. First, in analyzing the core security
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actors, Greece differs from both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. While in most cases of
security sector reform the expectation is a strengthening and development of core security actors,
Greece’s long history as a democracy and a military power, spanning back 2500 years, makes it a
bit of an anomaly in that it had established the core security elements of security sector reform
long before forming the democratic government ruling in Greece today (Gürsoy 2017, 111). In
fact, the military regime that gave way to democracy rendered an increase in core security actors
unnecessary, as the number of armed forces personnel was already established, as were other
core security actors such as intelligence (Gürsoy 2017, 112). Specifically, Greece had around
160,000 armed forces personnel in 1960, with that number steadily climbing until 1990, when it
reached 200,000 (Charalambis et al 2004, 364). This is unsurprising given the Greek army’s
power prior to their democratic transition and subsequent security sector reform.
Second, analyzing the security management and oversight bodies as an indicator of
reform provides a lot more insight into Greek security sector reform. As Greece was
transitioning from a military regime to a democracy, the oversight of the already existing core
security actors was vital to the success of the Greek security sector within the context of a
democracy. The most important reform came almost immediately after the democratic transition,
with the passage of a law in 1977 to reshape the structure of the armed forces so that they
reported to the Minister of Defense rather than to the president (Dokos 2007, 43). This was in
addition the acquisition of civilian advisors to the Defense Minister in order to add a level of
accountability of the military to the citizens (Dokos 2007. 43). Additionally, Greece developed
new Directorates for Terrorism, Organized Crime and International Cooperation, all of which
were focused on training and upgrading software so that the directorates were more accountable
to the rest of the government (Dokos 2007, 44). This indicator is perhaps the most important in
tracking the development of security sector reform in Greece, as the other elements of the
security sector were largely in place prior to democratization, but were simply misused or
unsupervised.
The third indicator of security sector reform, the reform of justice and law enforcement
institutions, occurred fairly immediately after the re-introduction of a democratic Greek
government. Since 1974 and the fall of the military regime, the Greek people have “enjoyed a
widespread commitment to liberal and democratic principles among the main political parties,”
including “a functioning system of independent courts, all speech, political or otherwise, has
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been entirely unrestrained, while regular free and fair elections return different parties to power”
(Eleftheriadis 2007). This fast and successful enforcement of judicial institutions stems from
Greece’s long history of enforcing the rights against government equal to the duties of the
government, and thus the success of reform in this area of the security sector is again
unsurprising (Eleftheriadis 2007). There is discussion among many scholars about
“modernization” of rule of law in Greece, as it still faces much corruption and political influence
and could stand to improve the quality of its institutions, especially its financial institutions, to
shelter against political influence over institutional decisions (Katsios 2006, 75). Overall,
however, the development of the justice and law enforcement institutions as an element of
security sector reform were fairly immediate and successful following the democratization of
Greece.
Last in understanding the development of the security sector in Greece, it is necessary to
analyze the development of non-statutory security forces in Greece. This element is perhaps the
least developed of the Greek security sector, as they had strong public security sector elements
immediately following their transition to democracy. The market for private security has
developed slowly, though it is still small. According to Steden and Sarre, researchers at Vrije
University in the Netherlands, a security market hardly existed in Greece until almost 2000
(2007, 228). Greece introduced legislation in 1997 regarding security licensing, seeing the
growing market, but it is still a comparatively small market in relation to other European
countries (Steden and Sarre 2007, 228). A specific niche of the private security market in Greece
is the private detective market, which is used mostly to invest commercial fraud (van Steden and
Sarre 2007, 228). This makes sense regarding the second indicator of security sector reform,
oversight bodies, and the agreement among scholars that there is still need for reform in this
indicator. However, overall the use of private detectives within the private security market
represents a continued expansion of the security sector, even twenty years after the initial reform
occurred with the democratization of Greece.
Last, it is necessary to compare the Greek economic situation against the security sector
reform that occurred. Greece’s GDP in 1973 was 22.348 billion USD, and steadily grew up until
the financial crisis of the 1980s. This is different from the economic situations of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Serbia, whose GDPs were falling while development of the security sector
occurred (World Bank 2018). This indicates an ability of Greece to expand their security sector
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that was absent in the other two cases. Despite the positive economic situation of Greece while
reform occurred in its security sector, in 1974 Greece’s newly elected government re-initiated the
Athens Association Agreement (along the same lines as a Stabilization and Association Pact
signed by the Western Balkan countries) to reinforce the Greek desire to fully integrate with
Europe and the EEC (Karamouzi 2015, 4). This led to 56 million USD in aid to Greece from the
European Economic Community, as well as harmonization of agriculture between Greece and
the EEC. This represents a turn towards international actors for guidance despite an economic
ability to support security sector reform on Greece’s part (Karamouzi 2015, 5). It also
demonstrates the value of relying on the EU for support in security sector reform, because
Greece wanted the democratic values of the EU in place in its government.

Conclusion
As Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia continue reform in their security sector, they will
continue to be influenced by the European Union and other external actors. That influence is
what has allowed their reform to continue through stunted economic growth, and has been vital
to their continuation in democratic reform, both generally as well as specific to the security
sector. Security sector reform, while it is largely funded by external actors because the
governments of developing countries in the Western Balkans are struggling too much
economically to support it themselves, has been steadily developing towards a full democratic
system that ensures the security of its citizens. Therefore, the stunted economic growth of the
countries considered in the case studies did not impact the reform because it is still occurring
through international actors. However, the heavy involvement of international actors in security
sector reform does raise complications as to what happens when the international actors leave.
Additionally, despite the major differences of Greek security sector reform in the 1970s
and 1980s and security sector reform in the Western Balkans today, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Serbia, as well as other Western Balkans countries, can look to Greece for guidance on how to
properly reform their security sector. Greece’s reliance on the European Union (the EEC at the
time) represented a Greek desire for democratic institutions (especially in the third indicator of
security sector reform, judicial and law enforcement institutions) and resulted in aid from the
EEC to achieve that development. The Western Balkans, in their security sector reform as a part
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of working towards EU membership, are right to rely on international actors and especially the
European Union to achieve proper security sector reform.
Areas of future investigation may include methods of transferring power from
international actors to governments in cases such as the Western Balkans has been supported and
influenced by external actors. Countries that are potentially candidates for the European Union
may suffer less from this trend than others, as joining the EU would ensure that the European
Union is a permanent actor in their affairs. However, other actors, such as the United Nations, or
NATO, still need to transfer power back to the individual governments in the Western Balkans,
raising the question how and when that will occur and what impact the lack of international
presence will have on the permanence of the reforms.
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Index 1: Table 1.1
This table summarizes the change in GDP as well as in each security sub-sector for each of the
three countries.

GDP
Core Security
Actors
Security
Management and
Oversight Bodies
Justice and Law
Enforcement
Institutions
Non-Statutory
Security Forces
External Aid

Bosnia and
Serbia
Herzegovina
-22.76%
-30.51%
Decrease
in personnel
increase in police and
government bodies
Technical increase,
No increase
though inefficient

Greece
+60.68

Increase in public
oversight bodies

No significant
updates since 2008

Increase in
institutions but not
effectiveness

Growing quickly, but
with limited
regulation
Yes

Increase in private
security companies

Increase in
effectiveness of
already existing
institutions
Very small increase
in private security

Yes

Yes
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